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Abstract 
In this paper, we scrutinize intellectual arrogance and intellectual humility through an 
evolutionary lens. Our basic thesis might be summarized as follows. Human cognition, 
though it partly transcends the natural order, remains rooted in it: it is half-emancipated, half-
embodied. In particular, it bears the lowly stamp of competitive dynamics that form part of 
the adaptive behavioral repertoire of all complex animals. Such dynamics, transmuted to the 
mental realm in human beings, help to explain, in psychological terms, why argumentation 
and ratiocination can be sometimes motivationally biased, but sometimes dispassionately 
truth-oriented too. Alongside furnishing our evolutionary-epistemological account of 
intellectual humility, we embed the construct in a wider nomological net, and report some 
recent empirical findings illustrating the automaticity of the tendency towards intellectual 
arrogance. We conclude by considering the role spirituality and religion might play in either 
helpfully fostering intellectual humility or inadvertently fostering intellectual arrogance. 
  
Intellectual Arrogance and Intellectual Humility: 
An Evolutionary-Epistemological Account 
 As we will below attempt to give a rather abstract account of the nature of intellectual 
arrogance (hereafter, IA) and intellectual humility (hereafter, IH), we think it salutary to begin 
with a concrete anecdote that vividly illustrates the latter. It comes from Richard Dawkins—
that gadfly of theists everywhere—who will no doubt be surprised to find himself so 
approvingly quoted in the pages of this august journal. Dawkins recounts a formative 
influence in his undergraduate life: 
There was an elderly professor in my department who had been passionately keen on 
a particular theory for, oh, a number of years, and one day an American visiting 
researcher came and he completely and utterly disproved our old man's hypothesis. 
The old man strode to the front, shook his hand and said, "My dear fellow, I wish to 
thank you, I have been wrong these fifteen years". And we all clapped our hands raw. 
That was the scientific ideal, of somebody who had a lot invested, a lifetime almost 
invested in a theory, and he was rejoicing that he had been shown wrong and that 
scientific truth had been advanced (Dawkins, 2006). 
This anecdote, we contend, shows someone exemplifying the virtue of intellectual 
humility (Roberts & Wood, 2003). What, then, makes the professor’s reaction so admirable? 
It is this: despite the theory disconfirmed being very much his own, the professor nonetheless 
manifested a complete readiness to give it up in the face of compelling evidence. His 
magnanimity in discharging his epistemic duty, moreover, magnifies the admirability of his 
response. Note that the professor’s response might well have been very different: he might 
have resisted the evidence by improbably dismissing it as flawed or fraudulent; or he might 
have privately resented or even publicly denounced the impudent upstart who destroyed his 
promising theory. Yet the professor did neither: he did not treat this theory as something to 
which he was entitled, nor did he construe its empirical disconfirmation as a threat. Rather, he 
cared everything for the truth, nothing for himself. His concerns were solely empirical, utterly 
selfless. 
Locating Intellectual Humility in the Nomological Net 
Intellectual humility, of the sort exemplified by the professor above, can be seen as a 
subset of two overlapping superordinate constructs: global humility and intellectual integrity.  
 Regarding global humility, several attempts have been made both to define it (Davis, 
Worthington, & Hook, 2010; Tangney, 2009) and to measure it (Ashton & Lee, 2005; Davis 
et al., 2010; Rowatt, Powers, Targhetta, Comer, Kennedy, & La-bouff, 2006), with a view to 
exploring its outcomes (Exline & Hill, 2012; Hilbiga & Zettlerb, 2009), alongside those of its 
near-opposites, arrogance (Johnson et al., 2010) and narcissism (Sedikides, Rudich, Gregg, 
Kumashiro, & Rusbult, 2004). Chief among the components of global humility are a 
willingness to admit imperfections, a tendency to focus on others rather than the self, and the 
capacity to see oneself realistically. 
Humility might also be seen as the first cousin of modesty. Sedikides, Gregg, and Hart 
(2007) defined modesty intrapsychically as the holding of an intermediately positive self-
view (see also Davis et al., 2010). Their justification was that similar definitions, as opposed 
to those referring to demure self-presentation, tend to be primary, rather than secondary, in 
leading dictionaries. Furthermore, surveys of what people intuitively understand by modesty 
yield reports that refer to intrapsychic concepts as often as interpersonal ones (Gregg, Hart, 
Sedikides, & Kumashiro, 2008), and in particular, to the mainly intrapsychic concept of 
humble.  
 Intellectual humility (Samuelson, Church, Jarvinen, & Paulus, 2012) then, can be 
construed as a form of specific humility or modesty. It reflects an intermediate and realistic 
evaluation of one’s epistemic capacities, as opposed to an intermediate and realistic 
evaluation of one’s capacities in general. As such, IH might also be classed as a specific type 
of self-esteem—given that self-esteem is fundamentally a self-evaluation (Zeigler-Hill, 
2013).
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Doing so puts IH in the same class as other forms of specific self-esteem, such as 
academic self-esteem, which afford incremental predictive validity over self-esteem generally 
(e.g., Marsh & O’Hara, 2008). It also forges heuristic links to other research literatures 
dealing with people’s blindness to their own cognitive limitations (Pronin, 2009; Kruger & 
Dunning, 1999).  
Yet the definition has a limitation: it is neutrally descriptive. IA and IH, however, 
seem to be essentially defined by the presence or absence of ego-involvement with one’s 
beliefs (Sherif & Cantril, 1974; Wayment & Bauer, 2008). To be intellectually arrogant is to 
fall prey, with respect to the evaluation of one’s epistemic powers, to the motive to self-
enhance (Sedikides & Gregg, 2008); to be intellectually humble, in contrast, is not to, but 
instead to prioritize the motive to accurately self-assess (Gregg, Sedikides, Gebauer, 2011). 
Accordingly, we prefer the following definition of IA: the inclination to regard a belief as 
true because it is one’s own. IH, conversely, would then be the inclination not to, or the 
disinclination to do so. Such a definition, we submit, properly captures the intrinsically 
motivational nature of IA and IH, with reference to the self as a whole. The psychodynamics 
of IA might well involve the following implicit syllogism: truth is good (Gregg & Cowley, 
2008); I am good (Sedikides & Gregg, 2008); therefore, what I believe is good, in virtue of 
being true. Clearly, the professor in the opening anecdote was conspicuously low in IA, on 
this definition: he was not inclined to regard the theory he developed as true because it was 
his own.  
IH can also be characterized as a subset of intellectual integrity. The latter can be 
understood as an idealized state of mind in which people, when apprehending themselves or 
the world, are perfectly truth-oriented. Otherwise put, their motivations are entirely alethic 
(from aletheia [Greek] = “truth”): they embody the attitude of the wholly unbiased truth-
seeker. When manifesting intellectual integrity, people pursue the truth dispassionately and 
do not evade it defensively. That is to say, competing motives are operative that would distort 
the apprehension of the truth—motives that we collectively label thymic (from thumos [Greek] 
= “urge”). Potentially, such motives are manifold. A very partial list would include the 
motives to preserve a belief in a just world (Lerner & Montada, 1998), to justify the status 
quo (Jost, Banaji, & Nosek, 2004), to verify existing self-views (Swann, 2012), to quell the 
terror of death (Greenberg, 2012), to maintain a sense of meaning (Heine, Proulx, & Vohs, 
2006), to maximize positive and minimize negative affect (Westen, Kilts, Blagov, Harenski, 
& Hamann, 2006), to achieve cognitive closure (Kruglanski & Webster, 1996), to avoid 
feelings of anxious uncertainty (McGregor, Nash, Mann, & Phills, 2010). Moreover, IA as 
defined above, also qualifies as one thymic motive, even if may partly overlap with other 
thymic motives (e.g., regarding a belief is true because it is one’s own might also allay 
feelings of anxious uncertainty.) Hence, IH is but one component of intellectual integrity. As 
such, then, it is not sufficient for intellectual integrity. Nonetheless, in the absence of IH—
that is, in the presence of IA—intellectual integrity is compromised. That is, IH is necessary 
for intellectual integrity. 
An Evolutionary Account of Intellectual Arrogance and Intellectual Humility 
Having conceptually situated IA and IH, and offered our preferred definition, let us 
now ask a very basic question: why should anyone regard a belief as likely to be true just 
because it is theirs? At one level, the matter might appear obvious. Do we not, if 
interpersonally observant, notice other people conspicuously cherishing their own beliefs? 
And do we not, if introspectively honest, notice that we tend to do the same? Yet, when 
trying to identify the exact reason why our holding a belief should make us more irrationally 
inclined to accept it, we may find ourselves a loss.  
To remedy this explanatory deficiency, we here suggest that the roots of both IA and 
IH can be illuminated by a consideration of human beings’ evolutionary past (Coyne, 2010; 
Darwin, 1859). We are aware, of course, that the theory of evolution remains perennially 
controversial, especially among the religiously inclined (Barbour, 1997; Behe, 1996; Pew 
Research Centre, 2009). We also acknowledge that, even though evolutionary theorizing 
provides a heuristic and integrative framework for understanding the structure and function of 
the human mind—one that is capable of yielding hypotheses that are at least in part 
empirically testable (Dennett, 1995; Neuberg, Kenrick, & Schaller, 2010)—there nonetheless 
exist serious a priori objections, raised by philosophical theists (Plantinga, 1993; Swinburne, 
1997) and atheists (Nagel, 2012; Tallis, 2011) alike, about whether evolutionary theorizing 
can adequately account for such distinctive features of the human mind as rationality and 
self-consciousness. Here we take an intermediate and hopefully ecumenical position: 
evolutionary theorizing, although it may not explain fully the most distinctive features of 
human psychology—like IA and IH—may at least help to explain them. 
Human Cognition is Partly Emancipated, Partly Embodied 
Humans differ from other animals most fundamentally in their cognitive powers. As 
symbolic animals (Sedikides & Skowronski, 2000), they can explicitly apprehend the world 
(Tallis, 1991), reflexively apprehend themselves (Corballis, 2011), engage in reflective and 
propositional thought (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2011; Strack & Deutsch, 2004), and 
express themselves linguistically (Pinker, 2008). So equipped, they are uniquely capable of 
knowing truth from falsity, and often willing to pursue the one in preference to the other. This 
ability to process and pursue truth to distinguish humans from non-humans not merely 
quantitatively but qualitatively, making their full explanation in naturalistic or evolutionary 
terms problematic (Nagel, 2012; Tallis, 2011). To this extent, human cognition may be partly 
emancipated from evolution—a fact that permits human beings, unlike other animals, to 
debate the truth or falsity of the theory of evolution itself. 
Nonetheless, there remain abundant signs that human cognition bears the hallmarks of 
its less lofty origins. The growing field of embodied cognition (Barsalou, 2008; Gallagher, 
2005; Schubert & Semin, 2009) has shown the diverse ways in which abstract or symbolic 
concepts can be scaled along concrete or bodily dimensions, with metaphorical 
correspondences implying an overlap (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980). For example, males, but not 
females, who clench their fists physically, then perceive themselves psychologically to be 
more esteemed, more assertive, and more powerful (Schubert & Koole, 2009). In addition, 
the vertical dimension of space implicitly scales power differentials and divinity perceptions 
(Schubert, 2005; Meier, Hauser, Robinson, Friesen, & Schjeldahl, 2007), while the horizontal 
dimension of space implicitly scales for interpersonal closeness and intimacy (Schubert & 
Otten, 2002; Williams & Bargh, 2008). Such findings bear out Wittgenstein’s (1953) dictum 
that the “[t]he human body is the best picture of the human soul (p. 178)”. Embodiment, then, 
clearly shapes thought. But now might the embodiment of the human mind, as shaped by the 
course of evolutionary history, explain IA or IH? 
Humans Have Evolved To Physically Compete (As Well As To Cooperate) 
Let us immediately note that, contrary to stereotypes of Darwinism, “the survival of 
the fittest” (Spencer, 1964, p. 144) need not necessarily entail the “Warre Of Every One 
Against Every One” (Hobbes, 1651, p. 101). Rather, mutual aid may be a no less viable route 
to individual survival and gene transmission (Kropotkin, 1902). In other words, to prosper 
and procreate, organisms can adopt either one of two basic evolutionary strategies vis-à-vis 
conspecifics: competition or cooperation. Obviously, context matters; but generally speaking, 
many organisms are highly cooperative (Nowak & Highfield, 2011). This is especially true of 
human beings, who—by widely trading complementary goods that they separately specialize 
in producing—mutually enrich one another even remotely (von Mises, 1963).  
That said, and despite much historical progress (Pinker, 2011), egocentric and 
antisocial impulses persist (Wilson & Herrnstein, 1985). For example, although people 
generously share their windfall gains with a stranger (Engel, 2011), they also nastily seize a 
stranger’s windfall gains (Bardsley, 2008). Such ethical duality makes adaptive sense: as 
human beings evolved, kin or group selection pressures would have made them partly 
altruistic—dutifully serving others and submitting to authority—but individual selection 
pressures would have kept them partly selfish—defiantly serving themselves and expressing 
their autonomy (Wilson, 2012). Both competitive and cooperative tendencies would have 
persisted, to be optimally expressed in the appropriate context (Nettle, 2006).  
The modest point that we wish to make here is that human beings retain a competitive 
streak, however qualified it may be by complementary tendencies towards cooperation, or 
however muted it may be by the advance of civilization. Hence, there is ever the potential for 
human beings to engage in aggressive zero-sum contests (von Neumann & Morgenstern, 
1947), where a victor seizes the territory or property of the vanquished (White, 2011), or 
where dominance and submission dynamics yield hierarchies of relative privilege (Sidanius 
& Pratto, 1999). Ultimately, too, all such political competition (Oppenheimer, 2007) proceeds 
either via naked physical aggression, or else via signals that it will occur in the absence of 
capitulation. Such physical aggression, if and when it manifests itself, necessarily takes 
embodied form. It entails (at least) one human being, X, attempting to physically dominate 
another, Y, by putting himself above Y and moving against Y (albeit often with the 
assistance of weapons), such that Y has the choice either of himself competing too—by 
attempting to physically dominate X, in the same way, and thereby escalating the conflict—
or physically submitting, by putting himself below X or by withdrawing from X, and thereby 
defusing the conflict (Price, Sloman, Gilbert, Gardner & Rohde, 1994).  
Thus, political competition ultimately reduces to an embodied reality for human 
beings, just as does for other animals who vie with one another for limited resources. As an 
embodied reality, therefore, competition is as liable to leave a mark on the cognitive 
architecture of human beings as is any other essential feature of their earthly existence. 
Moreover, this mark, we contend, can help to explain both IA and IH.  
Intellectual Arrogance: the Product of Ideological Territoriality and Mental 
Materialism 
People do not only think in a vacuum. They also engage in the social activity of 
argumentation (Willard, 1989). Moreover, it is a curious fact that the metaphors used to 
characterize argumentation almost exclusively invoke the idea of warfare (Lakoff & Johnson, 
1980). One attacks a weak argument, and counters with a stronger one. Some intellectual 
positions are indefensible, being held on shaky grounds, and criticism can be on target. One 
can even take a stab at making a case, and hope others get the thrust of what you are driving 
at. Such familiar metaphorical expressions—and their aptness when applied to most public 
and many debates—suggest that the purpose of argumentation rarely exemplifies the ideal 
expressed in Philebus dialogue of Plato’s (347 BC): "...we are not simply contending in order 
that my view or that of yours may prevail, but I presume we ought both of us to be fighting 
for the truth...". Rather, the purpose of argumentation seems often precisely to defeat one’s 
opponent definitively, not to understand reality better. Thus, one participant in argumentation 
makes a psychological gain at the expense of the other, rather than both mutually gaining 
from greater illumination. We label the phenomenon—manifested at a pragmatic, 
interpersonal level—ideological territoriality. 
Why does argumentation often take such an antagonistic interpersonal form? We 
propose that this question admits of a psychological answer. People experience their 
beliefs—the very matters over which they argue—as personal possessions (Abelson, 1986). 
They intuitively feel them to be objects they own, to which they are entitled, that no one else 
may take. Again, prevalent metaphors testify to this. As objects, they can be acquired, held, 
and discarded—clung to or given up. Like physical substances, they can be shaped, twisted, 
and conditioned, as well as being weighty, rock-solid, and well-supported; yet they may be 
too rigid and inflexible, and susceptible to being shattered or demolished. They are also 
valued commodities, being dearly held and cherished; one can even try to sell someone an 
idea, although no one may buy it. What this suggests is that is that beliefs are not held 
merely, or even primarily, because their propositional content accords with reality, but rather 
because they represent a type of cognitive asset residing in a psychological bank. 
Accordingly, people are averse to relinquishing beliefs, keen to have them grow, or both—
goals that ideological territoriality, respectively defensive or offensive, facilitates. We label 
this phenomenon—manifested at an epistemic, intrapsychic level—mental materialism. 
Thus IA—regarding a belief as true simply because it is one own—is a throwback to 
our evolutionary heritage.  Propensities that apply to the physical realm of resources, where 
organisms engage in zero-sum contests to gain a territorial monopoly, have been transmuted 
to the psychological realm of beliefs, where partisans engage in zero-sum contests to 
maintain ideological hegemony. Although beliefs are not extended in space (Descartes, 
1637/1991), and are not scarce being indefinitely replicable (Kinsella, 2012), people 
nonetheless relate to them psychologically as if they were concrete objects they can acquire 
and keep. 
Intellectual Humility: the Product of Appropriate Submission to Legitimate Epistemic 
Authority 
 Having tentatively attempted to account for IA in evolutionary terms, how might we 
characterize IH? To do so, we must triangulate between two initial possibilities, to achieve a 
subtle synthesis.  
The first possibility is that IH is simply the diametric opposite of IA. That is, just as 
IA entails a willingness or eagerness to retain or expand some subset of beliefs, because they 
are one’s own, IH contrariwise entails a willingness or eagerness to relinquish or contract that 
same subset of beliefs, for the same reason. In other words, whereas the intellectually 
arrogant, being confident, tend to declare and defend their ideological positions, the 
intellectually humble, being diffident, tend to conceal them or concede them.  
There is surely something in the characterization. Intellectually humble people, if they 
are anything, will on occasion not cling to beliefs like the intellectual arrogant will. The 
humble professor in the opening example distinguished himself by doing precisely this; a 
more arrogant professor would have reacted defensively. The intellectually humble might 
generally endorse the assertion by the American pragmatic philosopher C. S. Pierce (1878), 
that a belief is merely “the demi-cadence which closes the musical phrase in the symphony of 
our intellectual life [italics added] (p. 289)”, rather than the final word on the matter. But that 
does not mean that the intellectually humble are characterized solely by a tendency not to 
“stick to their guns” in argumentation.  Indeed, the tendency to regard a belief as false 
because it is one’s own is no more rational than as tendency to regard it as true: as an 
occasional motive, self-denigration, when it occurs, is no less thymic, and no more alethic, 
than self-enhancement. Accordingly, there is more to IH than a tendency towards ideological 
submissiveness, even if IA is reasonably characterized as a tendency towards ideological 
dominance. 
A second possibility, then, is not that IA is the diametric opposite of IH, but that it is 
what occurs in the absence of IA. Whereas IA represents human cognition in a relatively 
embodied form—reflective of zero-sum contests, IH represents human cognition in a 
relatively emancipated form—reflective of dispassionate rationality. IH is present whenever 
beliefs are critically evaluated entirely independently of whether or not they are one’s own or 
someone else’s. IH is whenever IA isn’t. 
Yet, this second possibility also has drawbacks. First, by defining IH as the absence of 
IA, it provides only a negative, and not a positive account, of it. Second, it fails to do justice 
to the fact that IH involves, as the previous possibility suggests, intellectual deference of 
some sort, albeit not generalized and unconditional. 
The trick, then, is characterize IH in evolutionary terms, while still acknowledging it 
as a form of emancipated cognition that is alethic rather than thymic in orientation. 
Accordingly, we offer this characterization: IH is due deference to an epistemic principle that 
one subjectively regards as having legitimate authority. This needs a little conceptual 
unpacking. 
One of the fundamental features of rationality is the one cannot believe whatever one 
wants to. For example, although it would be no doubt pleasing to believe all sorts of flattering 
propositions about oneself, reality constraints impose strict limits on such motives to self-
enhance (Sedikides & Gregg, 2008), and failure to observe such constraints, in any major 
way, would entail delusional self-inflation (Campbell & Miller, 2011). Thus, the everyday 
practice of not believing whatever one desires to believe—and, in particular, of not believing 
something just because it is one’s own belief—can be understood as the result of adherence to 
an epistemic norm, of observance of a self-imposed duty. Reason is a thus type of obligation 
(Gregg, 2009). Like all obligations, it requires deference: an imperative of some sort must be 
obeyed. However, unlike other obligations, which involve deference to people, as a function 
of interpersonal commands or agreements, rational obligations involve deference to 
principles that are regarded as instrumental in the successful pursuit knowledge. For example, 
to know mathematical truths, one should defer to the principles of logic; to know empirical 
truths, one should defer to the principles of science; and to know religious truths, one should 
defer to the principles of revelation.  
It goes without saying that the reliability of such principles is always up for 
discussion: this is the subject matter of epistemology (O’Brien, 2006). The case can be made 
that some principles take priority over others, or more radically, that some principles are 
invalid. But that is not our concern here, for we wish only to characterize IH psychologically. 
In our view, if a person subjectively regards some epistemic principle as having legitimate 
authority—in the sense that he or she regards it, in good faith, as reliably conducing to true 
justified belief—then deferring to that authority is what constitutes IH.  
Note how this account, at once, invokes both embodied and emancipated cognition. It 
invokes embodied cognition insofar as it appeals to the psychological dynamics of dominance 
and submission, which emerge from our biological heritage as earthly creatures with a 
propensity for zero-sum competition over scarce resources and territory. To be rational is to 
permit earnestly endorsed epistemic principles to dominate one’s thinking insofar as they 
determine what one can rightly believe. Otherwise put, these are the epistemic principles to 
which one must duly submit, however much one would prefer not to. In some sense, those 
principles “win,” and the rational person “loses.” Most empirical scientists (the authors are no 
exception) know how dispiriting it is to have their beautiful hypothesis slain by an ugly fact. 
They are dispirited precisely because they know they must give something up. To celebrate 
disconfirmation of one’s hypothesis—like the professor in the opening anecdote—is rare. 
But the account also invokes emancipated cognition insofar as it appeals to explicit 
understanding, not only of target phenomena and concepts, but also of the abstract methods 
that are understood to be more or less reliable means of attaining knowledge about those 
target phenomena and concepts. To be rational is to select—not some arbitrary authority 
whose pronouncements can be believed willy-nilly—but some legitimate authority whose 
epistemic credentials can be defended on rational grounds. Clearly, high-level cognition is 
called for here—far removed from more basic evolved propensities. 
The Spontaneity of Intellectual Arrogance 
 There seems to be little doubt that IA can be created or reinforced by such fully-
fledged motivational dynamics as cognitive dissonance (Cooper, 2007; Festinger, 1957). In 
particular, when people have publicly committed themselves to a counterattitudinal position 
(Leippe & Eisenstadt, 1994), or have come to believe that they have acted freely to bring 
about foreseeable aversive consequences (Cooper & Fazio, 1984), they are then liable, not to 
humbly and rationally abandon the beliefs that prompted the endorsement of that position or 
performance of that action, but instead to “double-down” on those beliefs, and come up with 
rationalizations that bolster them. There is good evidence, furthermore, that such 
rationalizations often serve to defend the ego against self-esteem threat, rather than being 
purely the products of sheer cognitive inconsistency (Steele, 1988; Stone & Cooper, 2001). 
Accordingly, when people’s motives switch the alethic to the thymic, under the sway of 
cognitive dissonance, their intellectual integrity is compromised, in virtue of the fact that they 
have, albeit inadvertently, committed themselves to a belief, thereby making it more 
intimately and undeniably “theirs”. The effect of abandoning such a belief, we argued above, 
would now be the psychological equivalent of ceding territory or of losing a valued 
possession. Accordingly, cognitive dissonance is liable to be a key cause of what we define 
as IA—considering a belief to be true simply because it is one’s own.  For example, one 
could easily imagine a professor far less magnanimous than Dawkins’s hero—one who 
boldly articulates a theory in public, commits himself to promulgating it, influences other 
researchers, thereby making the theory ever more “his” in his own eyes and in the eyes of his 
peers. Later, however, some evidence emerges suggesting that the theory is false. An 
understandable reaction would be for him to redouble efforts to confirm his theory.   
 But how basic is such intellectual arrogance? Must some cognitively complex 
process, such as cognitive dissonance, which serves to amplify commitment to and 
identification with a belief (see Abelson, 1988, 1995, for reviews of belief extremification 
dynamics), occur before IA manifests itself?  
One broad argument from analogy suggests not. Several minimal effects, all related to 
the self, have been well established (Greenwald & Banaji, 2005). These include the name 
letter effect (Koole & Pelham, 2003; Nuttin, 1985), where people show a spontaneous 
preference for letters in their name over other letters; the endowment effect (Kahneman, 
Knetsch, & Thaler, 1990; Morewedge, Shu, Gilbert, & Wilson, 2009), where people show a 
spontaneous preference for goods they own over those they do not; the minimal group 
discrimination bias (Otten, 2005; Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971), where people 
spontaneously distribute more goods to members of arbitrary ingroups than outgroups; and 
mnemic neglect (Green, Sedikides, & Gregg, 2008; Sedikides & Green, 2009), where people 
spontaneously fail to recall negative feedback, about traits that matter to them, when it is 
directed at themselves but not at others. All such effects can be also interpreted in terms of 
ownership: of one’s name letters, physical goods, valued ingroups, or important traits. If such 
self-related minimal effects occur, then IA may perhaps also occur as a minimal effect. 
Moreover, if so, it may be a feature of our psychological apparatus that is inherently difficult 
to eliminate. 
In this connection, consider mnemic neglect again. This is typically induced when 
participants are administered a credible but bogus personality test that supposedly yields 
mixed feedback, taking the form of concrete actions that participants are deemed likely to 
perform. However, the phenomenon can also be induced simply by asking participants to 
imagine receiving such feedback (Sedikides & Green, 2004, 2009). That is, even entertaining 
the hypothetical idea that the self might be in receipt of relevant negative feedback is enough 
to make people to recall such feedback more poorly. Thus, the barest pairing of self with 
negativity can induce a self-threat that is psychologically defended against by forgetting. 
Taking our cue from the above, we recently sought and obtained empirical evidence 
that IA also occurs spontaneously, in the form of the Spontaneous Preference for Own 
Theories (SPOT) effect (Gregg, Mahadevan, Cisek, & Sedikides, 2013). We engineered a 
situation that again involved the barest pairing of self, only this time, not with feedback of 
varying valence, but instead with a theory, progressively informed by pieces of empirical 
evidence. Specifically, in two studies, we told participants about a fictional planet on which 
two alien species dwelled. In Study 1, conducted online, the species were labelled Niffites and 
Luupites [see Gregg, Seibt, & Banaji, 2006]; in Study 2, conducted with paper-and-pencil 
materials, they were labelled Dassites and Fommites. Such nonsense names were designed to 
be low on prior meaning, to avoid biasing responses. In each study, the theory was that one 
alien species was a predator and the other was its prey, with nonsense names being 
counterbalanced across participants. After the predator-prey theory was stated, participants 
were presented with pieces of factual evidence bearing on that theory, one at a time. After the 
first piece was presented, participants rated their subjective likelihood that the theory was 
true, on a continuous scale ranging from 0% (Certain to be FALSE) to 100% (Certain to be 
TRUE), with 50% marking epistemic neutrality. On presentation of the subsequent six pieces 
of factual evidence, participants did the same, expressing their subjective likelihood that the 
theory was true or false in light of the accumulating evidence. The first three pieces were 
designed to be loosely confirmatory, the latter three to be more decidedly disconfirmatory. 
Hence, and as intended, participants generally went from believing the theory somewhat 
more likely to be true (>70%) to believing it more likely to be false (<40%).  
Crucially, participants in Study 1 were told to imagine either that (a) they themselves 
were the scientist who had the theory, and were evaluating it in light of the evidence, or that 
(b) someone else (an androgynous “Alex”) had the theory, and was doing the same thing.  In 
Study 2, a third condition was added: the theory was not ascribed to anyone. Thus, the two 
studies permitted a precise test of whether intellectual arrogance, as we have defined it—
believing a theory to be true because it is one’s own—existed. The only difference between 
conditions was in terms of whose theory it was merely imagined to be: one’s own, another’s, 
or no one’s. If participants judged the theory more likely to be true when ascribed to oneself 
as opposed to another or to no one, then there would be little alternative but to conclude that 
self-ascription caused participants to irrationally regard that theory as more likely to be true. 
Moreover, the minimal nature of the self-ascription—merely asking people in passing to 
imagine that a novel and fanciful theory was theirs—would testify indirectly both to the 
primary and potency of IA. For, if intellectual arrogance could be successfully induced when 
so little is at stake for the self, then it is likely to be a basic feature of the psychological 
apparatus, whose effects could easily be amplified under more high-stakes conditions. 
  As hypothesized, the SPOT effect duly emerged. In particular, participants in Study 1 
regarded the theory as being significantly more likely to be true when it was ascribed to them 
as opposed to another person, with the divergence in belief between the conditions growing 
larger as more pieces of evidence accumulated. Moreover, participants in Study 2 regarded 
the theory as being significantly more likely to be true when ascribed to them than when 
either ascribed to another person or to no one at all; furthermore, these last two conditions did 
not differ significantly from one another.  
Religion and Spirituality: Fostering Intellectual Arrogance or Humility? 
If our foregoing evolutionary-epistemological account is correct, then intellectual 
arrogance—regarding beliefs as more likely to be true because they are one’s own—would be 
an ever-present liability. It would emerge naturally—as a kind of “original sin”—from 
people’s default tendency to regard their beliefs as a kind of personal property (i.e., mental 
materialism), and to regard argumentation as a kind of ownership contest (i.e., ideological 
territoriality). Furthermore, the SPOT effect provides a telling empirical demonstration of the 
readiness with which intellectual arrogance manifests itself. If so, intellectual humility would 
be a virtue that needs careful nurturing (even if, as deference to an epistemic principle 
deemed legitimate, it would have its own evolutionary roots). What role, then, might 
spirituality and religion play in cultivating intellectual humility and combating intellectual 
arrogance? 
Certainly, the great spiritual and religious traditions have long condemned arrogance 
in general as a vice and extolled humility in general as a virtue. Theologically speaking, 
human humility seems well-justified: orthodox Christianity, for example, contrasts the utter 
perfection of Almighty God (Swinburne, 1997) with the intrinsic sinfulness of mortal man 
(Venema, 1994). People’s failure to curtail their self-regard in keeping with this stark 
ontological differential—pride (which encompasses arrogance)—has been branded as one of 
the Seven Deadly Sins (Catholic Church, 2003, 8, III), and been argued to lie at the root of all 
other sins (Aquinas, 1270; I-II, 77, 4, co.). In contrast, meekness is celebrated as a virtue 
(Matthew 5:5, Matthew 11:29, King James Version), and considered in the spiritual literature 
as a precondition for union with God (Merton, 1961). Furthermore, there has been a surge of 
recent interest in understanding empirically how humility (or a “quiet ego”) can be cultivated 
(Wayment & Bauer, 2008), including as a consequence of spiritual or religious practices 
(Wayment, Wiist, Sullivan, & Warren, 2011). 
But what of intellectual arrogance and intellectual humility in particular? Here, we 
briefly speculate, the impact of the great spiritual and religious traditions may be more mixed. 
On the minus side, all major world religions, including Christianity, have branches 
that teach didactically some sort of received dogma (e.g., the Nicene Creed). The credibility 
of that dogma rests, not only upon reasoned argument and empirical evidence, furnished by 
philosophy and science, but also upon some alleged revelation, conveyed prophetically or 
ecclesiastically, whose epistemic status, necessarily retaining elements of subjectivity, fails to 
convince outsiders. Simply put, people differ, for defensible reasons, about the validity of 
revelation as a source of knowledge, metaphysical or moral. Yet, the actual validity of 
revelation need not matter for determination of intellectual arrogance or humility. So long as 
people regard themselves has having good grounds to defer to the prophetic or ecclesiastic 
authority deemed to convey such revelations, then—even if others do not regard those 
grounds as good, and even if others are right not to regard those grounds as good—people 
may still be intellectually humble.  
Nonetheless, we would suggest that adherence to dogma contains an inherent danger. 
Given that religion is a prominent source of moral value (Graham & Haidt, 2010), and 
obedience is one of the six basic foundations of morality (Haidt, 2012), deference to 
prophetic or ecclesiastic authority might be improperly regarded as morally good in itself, 
rather than morally good because there are, on reflection, good grounds for accepting that 
authority in the first place. But intellectual submissiveness to authority is not intellectual 
humility: the former, unlike the latter, is a passive state of mind, characterized by reflexive or 
automatic deference (Milgram, 1974; Saroglou, Corneille, & Van Cappellen, 2009), and 
driven by introjected (i.e., externally derived) rather than autonomous (i.e., internally 
originating) motivation (Ryan & Deci, 2000). If one’s goal is to know the truth, then the 
authority to which one defers must itself be critically scrutinized as the deliberate act of a 
rational adult; otherwise one’s motivation is irrationally thymic, not rationally alethic. 
On the plus side, many great theologians have duly emphasized how God’s ineffable 
nature makes Him impossible for mortal minds to fully fathom (Hick, 2000). Accordingly, 
the great religious and spiritual traditions contain strands that emphasize, not only the 
epistemic accessibility of God, but also His epistemic elusiveness. In particular, those 
traditions contain, not only cataphatic strands, which assertively purport to describe who or 
what God is, and are hence conducive to the promulgation of dogma, but also apophatic 
strands, which unassumingly limit themselves to describing who or what God is not, and are 
hence conducive to the practice of mysticism (McGinn, 2006). The thrust of apophatic 
approach is that ideas of God, although they may be initially helpful, ultimately prove an 
impediment to union with Him, given that His essence transcends rational thought. Famously 
illustrating a shift from the cataphatic and the apophatic approach, Saint Thomas Aquinas—
who had devoted years to authoring weighty tomes of systematic theology—gave up writing 
towards the end of his life, feeling that his mystical experience of the Divine had rendered 
such writings redundant (Pieper, 1957). We would like to close by suggesting that, insofar as 
metaphysical beliefs are concerned, to the extent that religious and spiritual traditions 
emphasize an apophatic as opposed to cataphatic approach, they will tend to foster 
intellectual humility in their adherents, whereas to the extent that they do the reverse, they 








Abelson, R. P. (1986). Beliefs are like possessions. Journal for the Theory of Social 
Behavior, 16, 223-250. 
Abelson, R. P. (1988). Conviction. American Psychologist, 43, 267-276 
Abelson, R. P. (1995). Attitude extremity. In R. E. Petty & J. A. Krosnick (Eds.), Attitude 
strength: Antecedents and consequences (pp. 25-42). Mahwah, NJ: New Jersey. 
Ashton, M. C., & Lee, K. (2005). Honesty-humility, the Big Five and the Five-Factor model. 
Journal of Personality, 73, 1321–1353. 
Aquinas, T. (ca. 1270). Summa theologiæ. Online version retrieved from 
http://www.newadvent.org/summa/  
Barbour, I. G. (1997). Religion and science: Historical and contemporary issues (Rev. Ed.). 
San Francisco: Harper San Francisco. 
Bardsley, N. (2008). Dictator game giving: Altruism or artefact? Experimental Economics, 
11, 122–133. 
Barsalou, L.W. (2008). Grounded cognition. Annual Review of Psychology, 59, 617-645. 
Behe, Michael. Darwin's black box: The biochemical challenge to evolution. New York: The 
Free Press, 1996.  
Campbell, W. K., & Foster, J. D. (2007). The Narcissistic self: Background, an extended 
agency model, and ongoing controversies. In C. Sedikides, & S. Spencer (Eds.), 
Frontiers in social psychology: The self (pp. 115-138). Philadelphia, PA: Psychology 
Press. 
Campbell, W. K., & Miller, J. D. (2011). The handbook of narcissism and narcissistic 
personality disorder: Theoretical approaches, empirical findings, and treatments. 
Hoboken, NJ: Wiley.  
Catholic Church (2003). Catechism of the Catholic Church. Vatican City: Libreria Editrice 
Vaticana. 
Cooper, J. (2007). Cognitive dissonance: 50 years of a classic theory. London: Sage 
Publications. 
Cooper, J., & Fazio, R.H. (1984). A new look at dissonance theory. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), 
Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 17, pp. 229–266). New York: 
Academic Press. 
Corballis, M. C. (2011). The recursive mind: The origins of human thought, language, and 
civilization. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Coyne, J. (2010). Why evolution is true. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Darwin, C. (1859). On the origin of the species by means of natural selection, or, the 
preservation of favored races in the struggle of life. London: John Murray. 
Dawkins, R. (2006). Retrieved Jan 6
th
 2013 from 
http://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Richard_Dawkins#The_Root_of_All_Evil.3F_.28Januar
y_2006.29 
Davis, D. E., Hook, J. N., Worthington, D. R., van Tongeren, D. R., Gartner, A. L., Jennings, 
D. J., & Emmons, R. A. (2011). Relational humility: Conceptualizing and measuring 
Humility as a personality judgment. Journal of Personality Assessment, 93, 225-234. 
Davis, D. E., Worthington, E. L., & Hook, J. N. (2010). Relational humility: Review of 
measurement strategies and conceptualization as personality judgment. The Journal of 
Positive Psychology 5, 243-252. 
Dennett, D. (1995). Darwin's dangerous idea. New York: Simon & Schuster. 
Descartes, R. (1637/1991). Discours de la method […].  In J. Cottingham, R. Stoothoff, D. 
Murdoch, & A. Kenny (Eds. & Trans.), The philosophical writings of Descartes. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Kruger, J., & Dunning, D. (1999). Unskilled and unaware of it: How difficulties in 
recognizing one's own incompetence lead to inflated self-assessments. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 77, 1121–1134. 
Engel, C. (2011). Dictator games: A meta-study. Experimental Economics, 14, 583-610. 
Exline, J. J., & Hill, P. C. (2012). Humility: A consistent and robust predictor of generosity 
The Journal of Positive Psychology, 7, 208-218. 
Festinger, L. (1957). A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance. Stanford, CA: Stanford University 
Press. 
Gallagher, S. (2005). How the body shapes the mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Gawronski, B., & Bodenhausen, G. V. (2011). The associative-propositional evaluation 
model: Theory, evidence, and open questions. Advances in Experimental Social 
Psychology, 44, 59-127.  
Graham, J., & Haidt, J. (2010). Beyond beliefs: Religions bind individual into moral 
communities. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 14, 140-150. 
Green, J. D., Sedikides, C., & Gregg, A. P. (2008). Forgotten but not gone: The recall and 
recognition of self-threatening memories. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 
44, 547-561. 
Greenberg, J. (2012). Terror management theory: From genesis to revelations. In P. R. 
Shaver, & M. Mikulincer (Eds.). Meaning, mortality, and choice: The social 
psychology of existential concerns (pp. 17-35). Washington D.C.: American 
Psychological Association. 
Greenwald, A. G., & Banaji, M. R. (1995). Implicit social cognition: Attitudes, self-esteem, 
and stereotypes. Psychological Review, 102, 4-27. 
Gregg, A. P. (2009). Is identity per se irrelevant? A contrarian view of self-verification 
effects. Depression and Anxiety, 26, E49–E59. 
Gregg, A. P., & Cowley, M. (2008). The Good, the Bad, and the Truth-Value: Automatic 
Keatsian Cognition. Poster presented at the 56th annual Social Psychology Section 
preconference of the British Psychological Society, Dublin, Ireland. 
Gregg, A. P., Hart, C. M., Sedikides, C., & Kumashiro, M. (2008). Lay conceptions of 
modesty: A prototype analysis. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 34, 978-
992. 
Gregg, A. P., Mahadevan, N., Cisek, S., & Sedikides, C. (2013). The SPOT effect: A 
Spontaneous Preference for one’s Own Theories. Unpublished Manuscript, University 
of Southampton. 
Gregg, A. P., Sedikides, C., Gebauer, J. E. (2011). Dynamics of identity: Between self-
enhancement and self-assessment. In S. J. Schwartz, K. Luyckx, & V. L. Vignoles 
(Eds.), Handbook of identity: Theory and research (Vol. 1, pp. 305-327). New York, 
NY: Springer.  
Gregg, A. P., Seibt, B., & Banaji, M. A. (2006). Easier done than undone: Asymmetry in the 
malleability of automatic preferences. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 
90, 1–20. 
Haidt, J. (2012). The righteous mind: Why good people are divided by politics and religion. 
New York, NY: Pantheon 
Heine, S. J., Proulx, T., & Vohs, K. D. (2006). The meaning maintenance model: On the 
coherence of social motivations. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 10, 88-
110. 
Hick, J. (2000). Ineffability. Religious Studies, 36, 35-46. 
Hilbiga, B. E., & Zettlerb, I. (2009). Pillars of cooperation: Honesty–Humility, social value 
orientations, and economic behavior. Journal of Research in Personality, 43, 516–
519. 
Hobbes, T. (1991 [1651]) Leviathan (Ed. Richard Turk). Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Johnson, R. E., Silverman, S. B., Shymsunder, A., Swee, H., Rodopman, O. B., Bauer, J., & 
Chao, E. (2010). Acting superior but actually inferior?: Correlates and consequences 
of workplace arrogance. Human Performance, 23, 403–427. 
Jost, J. T., Banaji, M. R., & Nosek, B. A. (2004). A decade of system justification theory: 
Accumulated evidence of conscious and unconscious bolstering of the status quo. 
Political Psychology, 25, 881-919.  
Kahneman, D., Knetsch, J. L., & Thaler, R. H. (1990). Experimental tests of the endowment 
effect and the Coase theorem. Journal of Political Economy, 98, 1325-1348. 
Kinsella, S. (2012). Against intellectual property. Gaithersburg, MD: Laissez Faire Books. 
Koole, S. L., & Pelham, B. W. (2003). On the nature of implicit self-esteem: The case of the 
name letter effect. In S. Spencer, S. Fein, & M. P. Zanna (Eds.), Motivated social 
perception: The Ontario Symposium. (pp. 93-116). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. 
Kropotkin, P. (1902). Mutual aid: A factor in evolution. London: Heineman. 
Kruglanski, A. W., & Webster, D. M. (1996). Motivated closing of the mind: Seizing and 
freezing. Psychological Review, 103, 263–283. 
Lakoff, G., & Johnson, M. (1980). Metaphors we live by. University of Chicago Press. 
Leippe, M. R., & Eisenstadt, D. (1994). The generalization of dissonance reduction: 
Decreasing prejudice through induced compliance. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 67, 395-413.  
Lerner, M. J. & Montada, L. (1998). An overview: Advances in belief in a just world theory 
and methods. In L. Montada & M. J. Lerner (Eds.). Responses to victimizations and 
belief in a just world (pp/ 1–7). Plenum Press: New York.  
Marsh, H. W., & O’Mara, A. (2008). Reciprocal effects between academic self-concept, self-
esteem, achievement and attainment over seven adolescent years: Unidimensional and 
multidimensional perspectives of self-concept. Personality and Social Psychology 
Bulletin, 34, 542-552. 
McGinn, B. (2006). Essential writings of Christian mysticism. New York: Modern Library. 
McGregor, I. Nash, K., & Mann, N., & Phills, C. E. (2010). Anxious uncertainty and reactive 
approach motivation (RAM). Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 99, 133-
147. 
Meier, B. P., Hauser, D. J., Robinson, M. D., Friesen, C. K., & Schjeldahl, K. (2007). What’s 
“up” with God?: Vertical Space as a representation of the divine. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 93, 699-710. 
Merton, T. (1961). New seeds of contemplation. New Directions: New York. 
Milgram, S. (1974). Obedience to authority. Harper & Row Publishers: New York. 
Morewedge, C. K., Shu, L. L., Gilbert, D. T., & Wilson, T. D. (2009). Bad riddance or good 
rubbish? Ownership and not loss aversion causes the endowment effect. Journal of 
Experimental Social Psychology, 45, 947-951. 
Nagel, T. (2012). Mind and cosmos: Why the materialist neo-Darwinian conception of nature 
is almost certainly wrong. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Nettle, D. (2006). The evolution of personality variation in humans and other animals. 
American Psychologist, 61, 622-631. 
Neuberg, S. L., Kenrick, D. T., & Schaller, M. (2010).  Evolutionary social psychology.  In S. 
T. Fiske, D. T. Gilbert, & G. Lindzey (Eds.), Handbook of social psychology (5th 
Edition, Vol. 2, pp. 761-796).  New York: John Wiley & Sons. 
Nowak, M. A., & Highfield, R. (2011). Supercooperators: Why we need each other to 
succeed. New York: Simon & Schuster. 
Nuttin, J. M. (1985). Narcissism beyond Gestalt and awareness: The name letter effect. 
European Journal of Social Psychology, 15, 353–361. 
O'Brien, D. (2006). An introduction to the theory of knowledge. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Oppenheimer, F. (2007). The state. Montréal: Black Rose Books. 
Otten, S. (2005). The in-group as part of the self: Reconsidering the link between social 
categorization, in-group favoritism and the self-concept. In A. Alicke, D. Dunning, & 
J. Krueger (Eds.), The self in social perception (pp. 241-265). Philadelphia: 
Psychology Press. 
Pieper, J. (1957). The silence of St. Thomas. Chicago: Gateway. 
Pierce, C. S., (1878). How to make our ideas clear. Popular Science Monthly, 12, 286-302. 
 (The) Pew Research Center for the People and the Press (2009, July 9). Public praises 
science; scientists fault public, media. Retrieved February 12, 2012, from 
http://www.people-press.org/2009/07/09/public-praises-science-scientists-fault-
public-media/ 
Pinker, S. (2008). The stuff of thought: Language as a window into human nature. Harvard, 
MA: Harvard University Press. 
Pinker, S. (2011). The better angels of our nature: Why violence has declined. New York: 
Viking. 
Plantinga, A. (1993). Warrant and proper function. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Plato (347 BC). Philebus. Retrieved Jan 6
th
 2013 from 
http://classics.mit.edu/Plato/philebus.1b.txt 
Price, J., Sloman, L., Gilbert, P., Gardner, R., & Rohde, P. (1994). The social competition 
hypothesis of depression. British Journal of Psychiatry, 164, 309–315.  
Pronin, E. (2009). The introspection illusion. In M. P. Zanna (Ed.), Advances in Experimental 
Social Psychology, 41 (pp. 1-67). Burlington: Academic Press. 
Rhodewalt , F. (2012). Contemporary perspectives on narcissism and the narcissistic 
personality type. In M. R. Leary & J. P. Tangney (Eds.), Handbook of self and identity 
(2nd ed., pp. 571-586). New York: Guilford.  
Roberts, R. C., & Wood, W. J. (2003). Humility and epistemic goods. In M. DePaul & L. 
Zagzebksi (Eds.) Intellectual virtue: Perspectives from ethics and epistemology (pp. 
257-279). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. 
Rosenberg, M. (1965). Society and the adolescent self-image. Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press. 
Rowatt, W., Powers, C., Targhetta, V., Comer, J., Kennedy, S., & La-bouff, J. (2006). 
Development and initial validation of an implicit measure of humility relative to 
arrogance. The Journal of Positive Psychology, 1, 198-211. 
Ryan, R. M., & Deci, E. L. (2000). Self-determination theory and the facilitation of intrinsic 
motivation, social development, and well-being. American Psychologist, 55, 68-78. 
Samuelson, P. L., Church, I. M., Jarvinen, M., & Paulus, T. (2012). The science of 
intellectual humility: White paper. Retrieved Jan 6
th
 2013 from 
http://www.thethrivecenter.org/Thrive/Humility/White_Paper_Introduction/ 
Saroglou, V., Corneille, O., & Van Cappellen, P. (2009). “Speak, Lord, your servant is 
listening”: Religious priming activates submissive thoughts and behaviors. 
International Journal for the Psychology of Religion, 19, 143-154. 
Schubert, T., & Otten, S. (2002). Overlap of self, ingroup, and outgroup: Pictorial measures 
of self-categorization. Self & Identity, 1, 535-576. 
Schubert, T. W. (2005). Your highness: Vertical positions as perceptual symbols of power. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 89, 1-21.  
Schubert, T. W., & Koole, S. L. (2009). The embodied self: Making a fist enhances men’s 
power-related self-conceptions. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 45, 828 – 
834. 
Schubert, T. W., & Semin, G. R. (2009). Embodiment as a unifying perspective for 
psychology. European Journal of Social Psychology, 39, 1135–1141. 
Sedikides, C., & Green, J. D. (2004). What I don’t recall can’t hurt me: Information 
negativity versus information inconsistency as determinants of memorial self-defense. 
Social Cognition, 22, 4-29. 
Sedikides, C., & Green, J. D. (2009). Memory as a self-protective mechanism. Social and 
Personality Psychology Compass, 3, 1055-1068. 
Sedikides, C., & Gregg, A. P. (2008). Self-enhancement: Food for thought. Perspectives on 
Psychological Science, 3(2), 102-116. 
Sedikides, C., Gregg, A. P., & Hart, C. M. (2007). The importance of being modest. In C. 
Sedikides & S. Spencer (Eds.), Frontiers in social psychology: The self (pp. 163-184). 
New York, NY: Psychology Press. 
Sedikides, C., Rudich, E. A., Gregg, A. P., Kumashiro, M., & Rusbult, C. (2004). Are normal 
narcissists psychologically healthy? Self-esteem matters. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 87, 400-416. 
Sedikides, C., & Skowronski, J. J. (2000). On the evolutionary functions of the symbolic self: 
The emergence of self-evaluation motives. In A. Tesser, R. Felson, & J. Suls (Eds.), 
Psychological perspectives on self and identity (pp. 91-117). Washington, DC: APA 
Books. 
Sherif, M., & Cantril, H. (1947). The psychology of ego-involvements. New York: Wiley. 
Sidanius, J., & Pratto, F. (1999). Social dominance: An intergroup theory of social hierarchy 
and oppression. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Spencer, H. (1864) Principles of biology (Vol. 1). London: Williams and Norgate. 
Steele, C. M. (1988). The psychology of self-affirmation: Sustaining the integrity of the self. 
In L. Berkowitz (Ed.). Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, Vol. 21, p. 261–
302. New York: Academic Press. 
Stone, J., & Cooper, J. (2001). A self-standards model of cognitive dissonance. Journal of 
Experimental. Social Psychology, 37, 228-243. 
Strack, F., & Deutsch, R. (2004). Reflective and impulsive determinants of social behavior. 
Personality and Social Psychology Review, 8, 220-247. 
Swann, W. B., Jr. (2012). Self-verification theory. In P. Van Lang, A. Kruglanski, & E.T. 
Higgins (Eds.)  Handbook of Theories of Social Psychology (pp. 23-42). Sage: 
London. 
Swinburne, R. (1997). The evolution of the soul (2
nd
 Edition). Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Tallis, R. (1991). The explicit animal. London: Macmillan. 
Tallis, R. (2011). Aping mankind: Neuromania, darwinitis, and the misrepresentation of 
humanity. Durham: Acumen. 
Tajfel, H., Billig, M. G., Bundy, R. P., & Flament, C. (1971). Social categorization and 
intergroup behaviour. European Journal of Social Psychology, 1, 149 178. 
Tangney, J. P. (2009). Humility. In S. J. Lopez & C. R. Snyder (Eds.), Oxford handbook of 
positive psychology (pp. 483–490). New York, NY: Oxford. 
Venema, C. P. (1994). But for the grace of God: An exposition of the Canons of Dort. Grand 
Rapid, MI: Reformed Fellowship. 
von Mises, L. (1963). Human action. Chicago: Contemporary Books, Inc. 
von Neumann, J, & Morgenstern, O. (1947). Theory of games and economic behavior. 
Princeton, NJ. Princeton University Press.  
Wayment, H. A., & Bauer, J. J. (2008). Transcending self-interest: Psychological 
explorations of the quiet ego. Washington, D. C.: American Psychological 
Association Books. 
Wayment, H. A., Wiist, B., Sullivan, B. A., Warren, M. A., (2011). Doing and being: 
Mindfulness, health, and quiet ego characteristics among Buddhist practitioners. 
Journal of Happiness Studies, 12, 575–589. 
White, M. (2011). Atrocitology: Mankind's deadliest achievements. New York: W. W. 
Norton & Company.. 
Westen, D., Kilts, C., Blagov, P., Harenski, K., & Hamann, S. (2006). The neural basis of 
motivated reasoning: An fMRI study of emotional constraints on political judgment 
during the U.S. Presidential election of 2004. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 18, 
1947-1958. 
Willard, C. A. (1989). A theory of argumentation. Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama 
Press. 
Williams, L. E. & Bargh, J. A. (2008). Keeping one’s distance: The influence of spatial 
distance cues on affect and evaluation. Psychological Science, 19, 302–308. 
Wilson, E. O. (2012). The social conquest of Earth. New York: Liveright Publishing 
Corporation. 
Wilson, J. Q., & Herrnstein, R. J. (1985). Crime and human nature: The definitive study of 
the causes of crime. New York: Simon and Schuster. 
Wittgenstein, L. (1953). Philosophical investigations (Anscombe, G.E.M., trans.). Oxford: 
Basil Blackwell. 





 If intellectual humility and arrogance qualify as a form of specific self-esteem 
pertaining to one’s epistemic capacities, the question naturally arises of how these relate to 
global self-esteem (Zeigler-Hill, 2013), and to its grandiose cousin, (global) narcissism 
(Rhodewalt, 2012). We speculate that narcissism would show the stronger empirical link. On 
the grounds that specific and global forms of self-regard should be, almost by definition, 
somewhat correlated—either because the former cognitively informs the latter, or the latter 
affectively contaminates the former (Sedikides & Gregg, 2003)—a modest inverse link 
between intellectual humility and self-esteem might be expected, perhaps primarily driven by 
people with the lowest self-esteem harbouring sincere doubts about their epistemic capacities 
(“I’m always making mistakes”).  However, given that higher narcissism is empirically 
associated with arrogance and dominance, and hence lower narcissism with their absence, 
then—especially if our evolutionary-epistemic model of narcissism is correct—a relatively 
strong inverse link between intellectual humility and narcissism might be expected. 
 
